We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between o¤ers and countero¤ers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s. When players have di¤erent time preferences, reaching an immediate agreement may not be Pareto e¢ cient. The recursive technique developed in this paper generalizes that of Shaked and Sutton (1984) by incorporating the possibility of making unacceptable proposals into the backward induction analysis. Results from this paper extend all the previous …ndings and resolve some open issues in the current literature.
Introduction
Endogenous threats are an essential constituent of bargaining problems, as emphasized in Nash (1953) at the dawn of modern bargaining theory. This paper develops a general negotiation model that incorporates endogenous threats into the alternating-o¤er bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) . The early studies on this type of model, such as Fernandez and Glazer (1991) , Haller (1991) , Haller and Holden (1990) and Bolt (1995) , formally introduce the union's decision to strike in contract negotiations. Wen (1995, 2001 ), Houba (1997) , and Slantchev (2003) allow for more general forms of endogenous threats, modeled as a normal-form game, called the disagreement game, to be played between o¤ers and countero¤ers.
1 Despite of the fact that this class of games has complete information, it generally admits multiple equilibria, including ine¢ cient ones with delayed agreements or even no agreement at all. The set of the equilibrium payo¤s is fully characterized by the so-called extreme equilibria that yield the lowest and highest equilibrium payo¤s to each player. The backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) is commonly used to derive these extreme equilibrium payo¤s in this class of models.
The model studied in this paper allows for a generic disagreement game in normal form and a general set of possible agreements that might not even be convex. Despite of our well-understanding of this model under common time preferences, we cannot directly adopt the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) when players have di¤erent time preferences.
Characterizing extreme equilibrium payo¤s requires the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s. Under common time preferences and a convex set of possible agreements, all possible payo¤s are bounded by the bargaining frontier so that the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s must be a subset of the given bargaining frontier. In other words, any Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium must be achieved by immediate agreement. Consequently, making unacceptable proposals would not be e¤ective in obtaining extreme equilibria.
When players have di¤erent time preferences, however, it is possible to have equilibrium 1 See also surveys by Muthoo (1999) and Houba and Bolt (2002) .
payo¤s above the bargaining frontier even when all disagreement payo¤s are bounded by the bargaining frontier. Players may receive payo¤s above the bargaining frontier through intertemporal trade when they have di¤erent time preferences. It has been realized in other dynamic problems that Pareto improvement is possible through intertemporal trade among agents with di¤erent time preferences, see e.g., Ramsey (1928) , Bewley (1972) and, more recently, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) . In repeated games, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) demonstrate that many equilibrium payo¤s are outside the conventionally de…ned set of feasible payo¤s. The same phenomenon happens in the negotiation model when players have di¤er-ent time preferences. As a result, the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s is no longer a subset of the bargaining frontier. Therefore, we must incorporate the possibility of making unacceptable proposals in the analysis of the extreme equilibria.
2
Unlike in a repeated game where the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s is determined by the given stage game, such a frontier in a negotiation game depends on the extreme equilibrium payo¤s, which in turn depend on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s. Due to this interdependency of extreme equilibrium payo¤s and the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s, it is not trivial to extend the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) in this general setup. We show that the lowest equilibrium payo¤ to the proposing player is the most crucial extreme equilibrium payo¤ since it determines not only the other extreme equilibrium payo¤s but also the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s. The lowest equilibrium payo¤ to the proposing player is characterized by the least …xed point of a minimax problem when players are su¢ ciently patient. Except for some special cases, an analytical solution to the proposing player's least equilibrium payo¤ is not available in general due to the complicated nature of the problem.
Our analysis con…rms Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) who show that including unacceptable proposals into the analysis would not change the insights obtained by Rubinstein (1982) .
Excluding the possibility of making unacceptable proposals may have serious consequences in a negotiation model with a non-degenerate disagreement game. This issue …rst surfaced when Bolt (1995) demonstrated that the strategy pro…le supporting the …rm's worst equilibrium in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) fails to be an equilibrium when the …rm is less patient than the union. Our analysis in this paper identi…es the root of this problem in general and resolves
some issues left open in the literature.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a general negotiation model with a generic disagreement game and a generic set of possible agreements. The analysis is partitioned into three subsections. In Section 3.1, we derive a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for extreme equilibrium payo¤s. In order to solve the extreme equilibrium payo¤s, we need to know the Pareto frontier of continuation payo¤s, which is studied in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3, we derive the worst equilibrium to the proposing player. All our results can be related to the literature, as we discuss in Section 3.4. In Section 4 we apply our results to the special case with a common interest disagreement game to illustrate our …ndings and resolve some open questions.
The Model
Two players, called 1 and 2, negotiate for an agreement in the presence of a disagreement game. In any period before an agreement is reached, one player makes a proposal and the other player decides whether to accept the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, then the negotiations end with the accepted proposal as the agreement. Otherwise, the players play the disagreement game once before the negotiations proceed to the following period.
More speci…cally, there are in…nitely many periods and two players alternate in making proposals. Let B f(x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 R 2 : x 1 + x 2 1g be the non-empty, closed, and strictly comprehensive set of possible agreements in terms of average present values to the two players. The Pareto frontier of B is referred to as the bargaining frontier. For convenience, let i : R ! R be the continuous and strictly decreasing function that describes the bargaining frontier; (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 B is on the bargaining frontier if and only if x i = i (x j ) for i; j = 1; 2, and i 6 = j. The disagreement game is given in normal form:
where A i is the set of player i's disagreement actions that is assumed to be non-empty and compact, and d i ( ) : A ! R is player i's disagreement payo¤ function that is assumed to be continuous, where A = A 1 A 2 is the set of disagreement outcomes. We assume that G has at least one Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality, every player's minimax value in G is normalized to 0. Lastly, assume that every disagreement outcome is weakly dominated by some agreement; d(a) 2 B for all a 2 A.
A generic outcome path, denoted by = a 1 ; a 2 ; ; a T ; x for T 0, consists of all disagreement outcomes (a t 2 A in period t for t T ) before the agreement x 2 B is reached in period T + 1. Such an outcome path speci…es an immediate agreement with T = 0, and perpetual disagreement with T = 1. Player i's intertemporal time preference on the set of all possible outcome paths is represented by his average discounted payo¤s from the disagreement game before the agreement and the agreement itself afterward:
where i 2 (0; 1) is player i's discount factor per period.
The negotiation model described so-far is a well-de…ned noncooperative game of complete information. A history is a complete description of how the game has been played up to a period. A player's strategy speci…es one appropriate action for every …nite history. For technical convenience, we allow for publicly correlated strategies where players can coordinate their continuation play based on public coordination devices. Every strategy pro…le induces a unique distribution on outcome paths and players evaluate their strategies based on their expected average discounted payo¤s. The equilibrium concept applied throughout this paper is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Many important and in ‡uential studies in the literature are special cases of this general negotiation model. For example, one may interpret the models of Rubinstein (1982 ), Herrero (1989 , and van Damme (1991) having a degenerate disagreement game. Fernandez and Glazer (1991) study the case of a speci…c common interest disagreement game and a linear bargaining frontier, while Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) further impose a common discount factor. With a general disagreement game and a common discount factor, Wen (1995, 2001) 
The Set of SPE Payo¤s
Given a Nash equilibrium in the disagreement game, the negotiation model has a stationary SPE that speci…es the Nash equilibrium in every disagreement game. Standard arguments apply to the establish existence of such a stationary SPE, which we omit. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in the disagreement game ensures that set of SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model is non-empty. The key to characterize the set of SPE payo¤s is then to derive each player's lowest and highest SPE payo¤s, referred to as extreme SPE payo¤s. We …rst provide a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for these extreme SPE payo¤s in Section 3.1. In applying these conditions to derive the extreme SPE payo¤s in one period, we need to know the Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s in the following period. We then focus on these e¤ective continuation payo¤s in Section 3.2. It turns out that the Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s depends on both the discount factors and the extreme SPE payo¤s. As shown in Section 3.3, this inter-dependency between the extreme SPE payo¤s and the Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s requires a new set of techniques to analyze the negotiation model with di¤erent time preferences. Our analysis is su¢ cient to characterize the extreme SPE payo¤s, and hence the set of SPE payo¤s in any negotiation game. Finally, we will tie our results to the existing literature on the negotiation model in Section 3.4.
Extreme SPE Payo¤s
Let E i , for i = 1 and 2, be the non-empty set of SPE payo¤s in any period in which player i makes a proposal to player j for j 6 = i. For simplicity, we suppress all the other parameters that E i may depend on, such as the discount factors. Given the model setup, E i is a bounded subset of R 2 + . Applying the technique of self-generating payo¤s for a repeated game by Abreu et al. (1986 Abreu et al. ( , 1990 , and for a bargaining game by Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Binmore (1987) , 3 we can prove that E i is also compact and convex. 4 Given the compactness of E i , for l = i and j, player l's lowest and highest SPE payo¤s when player i proposes are
In any period in which player i proposes, after player j rejects player i's proposal, the players have to play a disagreement outcome a 2 A in the current period and a continuation SPE with payo¤ vector v = (v i ; v j ) 2 E j in the following period when player j proposes.
Playing a 2 A in the current period and v 2 E j in the following period is a SPE if and only if, for l = i and j,
where
is at least what he could obtain by deviating from a 2 A in the current period followed by his lowest SPE in the following period. Obviously, any Nash equilibrium of G satis…es (3) for all discount factors and all continuation payo¤s. By incorporating the possibility of unacceptable proposals explicitly in the backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) , we obtain the following result:
Proof. In any period in which player i proposes, player j may either accept or reject player i's proposal. A strategy pro…le also requires how the game will be played after player j rejects every possible proposal by player i, which generally depends on the rejected proposal.
More speci…cally, a SPE must specify a proposalx = (x i ;x j ) 2 B by player i, and for all x 2 B, player j's response to x and a continuation SPE that consists of a(x) 2 A and v(x) 2 E j after player j rejects x. Denote player i's payo¤ from such a general SPE as
First, consider any sequence of proposals fx n g 1 n=1
For v i to be player i's SPE payo¤, player j must reject x n and player i must receive no more than v i after player j rejects x n for all n 1 (otherwise, player i would have an incentive to propose x n instead). In other words, for all n 1, we have
Since A is compact by assumption, sequence fa(
A has a convergent subsequence, say (without loss of generality) lim n!1 a(x n ) = a 2 A. The compactness of E j then implies
E j also has a convergent subsequence, say (without loss of generality) (3) for all n 1, so does ( a; v) due to the continuity of d( ). As n ! 1, the two inequalities in (9) become
Note that
By the monotonicity of i ( ), we obtain
which is bounded from below by the right-hand side of (4). Let (â;v) be a solution to the optimization problem (4). Consider the following strategy pro…le^ :
-player j accepts x if and only if
Strategy pro…le^ constitutes a SPE, from which player i receives exactly (4). Hence, (4)
Second, acceptingx is a best response for player j if and only ifx j (1
Together with (8), we have
which is bounded from above by the right-hand side of (5). The strategy pro…le^ above with (â;v) being a solution to the optimization problem in (5) supports player i's highest
Third, player j certainly rejects any x 2 B such that x j is less than the right-hand side of (6), because player i cannot receive less than his lowest continuation payo¤ after rejecting any proposal. Therefore, player j's SPE payo¤s are bounded from below by the right-hand side of (6). Furthermore, player j receives exactly the right-hand side of (6) in the SPE^ above with (â;v) being a solution to the optimization problem in (6).
Lastly, since player j certainly accepts any x 2 B such that x j is greater than the righthand side of (7), player i will never propose x 2 B such that x j is more than player j's highest continuation payo¤. In other words,x j must be less than or equal to the right-hand side of (7). Whether player j acceptsx or not, player j cannot obtain more than the right-hand side of (7). Again, player j receives exactly the right-hand side of (7) in the SPE^ above with (â;v) being a solution to the optimization problem in (7).
Note that (4) and (5) Although the objective functions in (4)- (7) are well-de…ned and continuous, A is compact, we know nothing about E j at this stage other than its non-emptiness, compactness, and convexity. In order to fully understand the issues involved, we have to discuss e¤ective continuation SPE payo¤s in solving these extreme SPE payo¤s. We next show that the most e¤ective continuation SPE payo¤s in solving (4)-(7) are those that are on the Pareto frontier of E j . Accordingly, denote the Pareto frontier of E j as
Since E j is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of R 2 + , both ' i ( ) and ' j ( ) are continuous and non-increasing. Given Proposition 1, the following conditions on the responding player j's extreme SPE payo¤s are immediate:
Proof. Substituting (3) into (6), we have
which is (11) since player j's minimax value in G is normalized to be zero. For l = j, (3) and (10) imply that
Substituting (13) into (7), we obtain (12).
For su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , Proposition 2 implicitly describes how the players behave in the responding player's worst and best SPEs. In player j's worst SPE, if player j rejects any proposal, he will receive his minimax value of 0 when playing G in the current period followed by his lowest SPE payo¤ m j j in the following period. In player j's best SPE, on the other hand, if player j rejects any proposal, he will receive his highest continuation payo¤, taking into account that player i must be compensated in the following period after complying in the disagreement game. In fact, when the players are su¢ ciently patient, (11) and (12) hold with equalities for the responding player's lowest and highest SPE payo¤s.
These results generalize those of Busch and Wen (1995) .
We now turn to the proposing player's extreme SPE payo¤s.
Proposition 3 For all ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , we have
Proof. Substituting (3) and (13) into (4) yields 
Substituting the last inequality and (3) into (7) yields
which is equivalent to (15) due to the monotonicity of i ( ) and the normalization of player j's minimax value in G.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that proposing player's lowest SPE is essential to determine the other extreme SPE payo¤s. In order to solve m i i from (14), we need to know the Pareto frontier of E j , which contains the e¤ective continuation payo¤s.
E¤ective Continuation Payo¤s
First, we discuss how E j is determined by the players'lowest SPE payo¤s. Whenever player j proposes, = a 1 ; a 2 ; ; a T ; x can be supported as a SPE outcome path if and only if for all t T + 1,
for l = i and j;
and for all t T ,
For t = T + 1, (16) implies that no matter who proposes the …nal agreement x 2 B, it needs to be a SPE agreement in period T + 1. Condition (17) states that if player l deviates from a t in period t T , then this player will be punished by his lowest SPE payo¤, either m (17) imply that for any
Due to Proposition 2, when the discount factors are su¢ ciently large, we can rewrite In Proposition 3, we show that only the Pareto frontier of E j is e¤ective in solving m i i from (14). In the rest of this subsection, we provide speci…c structures on the continuation paths that achieve the Pareto frontier of E j , which requires the insights in Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) derived for repeated game with di¤erent time preferences. The key issue is that there may be many SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model that can be above the bargaining frontier. Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) investigate in great detail the Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s in a repeated game under di¤erent time preferences. There are many obstacles in directly applying their results to a negotiation game. SPE payo¤s in a repeated game are bounded from below by players'stage-game minimax payo¤s that are invariant with respect to the discount factors and time periods. In a negotiation game, however, players' lowest SPE payo¤s depend on the discount factors and also on who proposes. A typical outcome path in a negotiation game ends with an agreement that ceases any future payo¤ variation.
In a repeated game, it may not be possible to have a SPE in which a player receives exactly his minimax payo¤, so it is often su¢ cient to provide a SPE where a player's payo¤ is su¢ ciently close to his minimax value. In a negotiation game, however, we need the SPE where a player receives exactly his lowest SPE payo¤. In order to derive the Pareto frontier of E j , we have to modify Lehrer and Pauzner's technique for these di¤erences between a repeated game and a negotiation game.
According to Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) , in order to characterize the Pareto frontier of E j in the direction of = ( i ; j ) 2 , where R 2 + denotes the unit simplex, we need to solve the following optimization problem: (16) and (17).
In other words, (18) provides the payo¤ vectors on the Pareto frontier E j in the direction of 2 . When G is a …nite game, E j is a polygon in R 2 + and (18) provides us all the vertices in the direction of 2 . Note that under (16) and (17), we can write (18) as
where y t = d(a t ) 2 d(A) for all t T and y T = x 2 B \ E j at t = T + 1. In the rest of this subsection, we will solely focus on i < j , while similar arguments apply for i > j .
When i < j , for all = ( i ; j ) 2 , the weight ratio
is monotonically increasing with respect to t 0. Therefore, in any potential solution to (18) with T > 0, we must have
whenever it is possible under (16) and (17). Given i < j , the weight ratio will be greater than one for su¢ ciently large t. This implies that the two players must reach an agreement within …nite periods in any potential solution to (18). These arguments narrow down the potential solutions to (18). Given (19), sequential rationality (16) the Pareto frontier of d(A), provided that (16) and (17) hold. As in a repeated game, player j's per-period payo¤ during the early phase of such an outcome path could be lower than his minimax value. Since player j's payo¤ increases over time, his average payo¤ from the entire path will not be less than his lowest SPE payo¤. Let v , for all 2 , denote the payo¤ vector resulting from a solution to (18) under (19). Figure 1 illustrates the curve of payo¤ vectors v for all 2 under a linear bargaining frontier. Similar as in Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) , this curve is continuous in all d (a t ) and the …nal agreement that is either To summarize, whenever time preferences are su¢ ciently di¤erent, the Pareto frontier of E j is generally above the bargaining frontier. 6 This will a¤ect how m i i is determined. As we have shown above, the Pareto frontier of E j is rather complicated, which prevents us from obtaining a closed-form solution for m i i . Nevertheless, our analysis provides a general technique on how to solve the players'lowest SPE payo¤s, and, hence, how to characterize the set of SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model when i 6 = j . In the next section, we will demonstrate how this technique works for a common interest disagreement game and a linear bargaining frontier.
Proposing Player' s Lowest SPE Payo¤
In the previous subsections, we have established that m 
Since ' 
As we have shown in Section 3.2 for the case of i < j , ' j ( ) in this part of its domain is independent of m j j for su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ).
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In order to present our next main proposition, we need additional notation. For every a 2 A, de…ne
which is a monotonic increasing and continuous function of x i . Given a 2 A, F (x i ; a) has, at least, a …xed-point over the following interval:
Because both i ( ) and j ( ) are monotonically decreasing functions, we have
The last two inequalities and the monotonicity of function F ( ; a) imply that F ( ; a) maps from [x i (a); x i (a)] into itself. By Brouwer's …xed point theorem, F ( ; a) has a least …xed-point in [x i (a); x i (a)]. In many cases, such as when the bargaining frontier is linear, F ( ; a) has a unique …xed-point for all a 2 A. However, this may not the case in general. Let
F (x i ; a) = x i g denote the set of all …xed-points of (21). Since
is a closed subset of a compact interval, hence it is compact.
Now de…nê
; min
Our next proposition identi…es the least …xed-point of ( ) in the re…ned interval of [0;m 
To summarize, we have shown that ( Our next proposition asserts that when the discount factors are su¢ ciently close to 1, the least …xed-point of ( ) can be supported as a SPE payo¤ of player i. Therefore, proposing player i's lowest SPE payo¤ m i i indeed coincides with the least …xed-point of ( ). Since the proof is rather long, we defer it to the Appendix.
Proposition 5 There exists a^ 2 (0; 1) such that for all j > i ^ , there is a SPE in which player i receives the least …xed-point of ( ).
Case 2 
2 . This ends our discussion on Case 2.
Discussion and Related Literature
We have provided a complete procedure for deriving the proposing player's lowest SPE payo¤ for su¢ ciently large discount factors. We are then able to characterize all other extreme SPE payo¤s and, hence the set of SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model when the discount factors are su¢ ciently large. The Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s is rather complicated under di¤erent time preferences, which makes it impossible to obtain a closed-form solution to the proposing player's lowest SPE payo¤. Although our discussions in the rest of this section refer to Case 1 in Section 3.3, they apply to both cases.
Proposition 4 provides an upper bound on the proposing player's lowest SPE payo¤, (1995) , resulted from receiving alternately g i (a) (from making unacceptable proposals) and 0 (from being minimaxed after rejecting any proposal). The second term in (22) extends to what has been identi…ed by Busch and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997) for two subclasses of the current model where both players always make acceptable proposals in player i's worst SPE.
There are situations wherem i i is in fact player i's lowest SPE payo¤. When the frontier of SPE payo¤s is a subset of the bargaining frontier, such as when the two players have a common discount factor and B is convex, it can be veri…ed thatm i i is the least …xed point of ( ). This result generalizes Haller (1991) , Haller and Holden (1990) , Busch and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997) to an arbitrary convex set B. Note however that common time preferences alone are not su¢ cient to warrant this conclusion, we also need B to be convex.
We can take this insight one step further. In player i's worst SPE, if we never need any SPE whose payo¤ vector is above the bargaining frontier,m i i will be player i's lowest SPE payo¤. Suppose thatâ 2 A is a solution to (20) at the least …xed point of ( ) and
Then the only e¤ective continuation payo¤ in solving (20) 
is also likely the case that
i is the least …xed point of ( ), and hence player i's
trivial if player i has only one disagreement action, such as the …rm in the wage bargaining model analyzed by Fernandez and Glazer (1991) , Haller (1991) , Haller and Holden (1990) and Bolt (1995) .
In the case of a linear bargaining frontier j (x i ) = 1 x i as in most of the current literature, F ( ; a) is a contraction mapping, hence has a unique …xed-point for all a 2 A.
Accordingly, (22) simpli…es tô
where the second term is the expression identi…ed by Muthoo (1999) Our study strengthens the …ndings by Rubinstein (1982) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Herrero (1989 ), van Damme (1991 , and many others in the standard alternating-o¤er bar- This result theoretically underpins the commonly held wisdom for the standard alternatingo¤er bargaining model; it is without loss of generality to assume that only acceptable proposals support the extreme SPE payo¤s, which is also formally examined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) in this simple case.
Common Interest Disagreement Games
In this section, we focus on an important class of negotiation games that contains the models studied in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) , Haller and Holden (1990) , Bolt (1995) , and Slantchev (2003) . The set of possible agreements is assumed to be B = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 R 2 :
The disagreement game is a common interest game where there exists a unique Pareto dominant disagreement outcome. 8 Formally, there is an a 2 A such that
Without loss of too much generality, we assume that d(a ) is on the bargaining frontier, i.e., d 1 (a ) + d 2 (a ) = 1. Note that a 2 A is a Nash equilibrium in G, and also a serious candidate to (24). In fact, the value of the objective function in (24) at a 2 A,
can be supported as a player i's SPE payo¤ when the discount factors are su¢ ciently large.
The proof of the following proposition is similar to but much simpler than that of Proposition 5. It is straightforward to verify the following SPE. The strategy pro…le speci…es a after player i's proposal is rejected and player i's minimax outcome in G after player i rejects any proposal. Player i demands x i (a ) whenever player i proposes, and player j accepts player i's demand x i (a ) if and only if i j . Accordingly, we have Proposition 6 For su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , there is a SPE where player i receives x i (a ) and player j receives no less than 1 x i (a ) in a period when player i proposes.
With the linear bargaining frontier and the common interest disagreement game, most results in Section 3 can be further re…ned. First, (7) implies that for all
For su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , (25) implies that in player j's best SPE, if player j rejects any proposal, player j will receive his highest disagreement payo¤ d j (a ) in the current period followed by his highest SPE payo¤ M j j in the following period. Our next proposition characterizes the proposing player's highest SPE payo¤.
Proposition 7 For su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , we have
Proof. In this class of negotiation games, (5) becomes
For su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , however, it cannot be the case that
Suppose not, then M Proposition 8 For su¢ ciently large ( i ; j ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , we have (26) and (11) imply that M j j
Together with Proposition 6, i.e., m 
(28) and (29) Consequently, such a continuation can never be e¤ective in solving (4). For all even T , any convex combination of v( T ) and v( T +2 ) can be achieved by a publicly correlated strategy between T and T +2 .
For su¢ ciently large i < j , when v i is su¢ ciently close to i m i i , We now demonstrate a SPE where the continuation payo¤s are on the …rst linear segment of the Pareto frontier ' 2 ( ), i.e., continuations involve at most two periods of delay in reaching an agreement. Consider the following strategy pro…le:
In an odd period, player 1 demands
and player 2 will reject if and only if player 1 demands more than x 1 .
If player 1 demands more than x 1 and player 2 rejects, then (U; R) will be played.
In an even period, if player 1 deviates from U in the last (odd) period, player 2 will o¤er 1 x 1 and player 1 will accept.
Otherwise, with probability 1 p, player 2 will o¤er 1 x 1 in the current even period, and with probability p, (U; L) will be played for two periods, followed by player 2's o¤er 1 x 1 . Player 1 accepts in both cases. In this equilibrium,
In an even period, if player 1 rejects 1 x 1 (that should be accepted), then (D; R) will be played once followed by player 1's demand x 1 .
If player 2 deviates from the strategies described above, then continuation will switch immediately to the stationary SPE from which player 1 receives 0.5.
To verify that the above strategy pro…le constitutes a SPE, …rst note that player 1 has no incentive to deviate from (U; R) if his payo¤ from deviation is the same as what player 1 receives if he does not: 
One can show that (33) holds for p as given by (32). Next, player 1 should demand x 1 rather than making an unacceptable proposal, which follows from (33). Lastly, player 1 cannot demand more than x 1 since 1 x 1 is exactly equal to player 2's continuation payo¤ after rejecting any demand higher than 
In fact, (33) and (34) yield x 1 and p as given by (31) and (32), respectively. it would be too costly to compensate player 1 during the delay in the continuation. When this happens, the SPE of Proposition 6 is likely to be player 1's worst SPE. However, such incidence diminishes as the value of " decreases. Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl.
